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Unrevised Section 2-207--Different Terms Revisited

Sidney Kwestel [FNa1]

Courts and commentators agree that unrevised U.C.C. § 2-207, the “battle of the forms”
provision, suffers from a lack of clarity. [FN1] However, that should not be a license to add to
the murky waters, more particularly to adopt a rule--the knockout rule--that lacks support in the
statutory scheme. Let us consider a hypothetical. B sends S a written offer to purchase 10
computers, Model No. 2100, at a cost of $5,000 for a computer. The offer states: “you warrant
that your Model No. 2100 computers have the same features and capabilities as your competitor's
Model AB700.” The warranty is critical because the Model 2100 was worth only $2,000 to B
without the warranty. S sends a seasonable written acknowledgement that contains a definite
expression of acceptance but adds: “S makes no express warranty and disclaims and excludes
any express warranty.” Given these facts, has a contract been formed, and what are its terms? It
is a classic battle of the forms dispute. More specifically, has a contract been formed on the
terms offered or does the different express warranty term in S's acceptance knock out the express
warranty in B's offer? For an answer, we first turn to unrevised section 2-207, which provides in
pertinent part:
(1) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confirmation which is
sent within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even though it states terms
additional to or different from those offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is
expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms.
(2) The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the contract.
Between merchants such terms become part of the contract unless:
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer;
(b) they materially alter it; or

(c) notification of objection to them has already been given or is given within a
reasonable time after notice of them is received.
Courts are basically in agreement that under section 2-207 if S's response constitutes a
definite expression of acceptance a contract is formed under subsection (1) even though S's
response states express warranty terms different from the express warranty terms in B's offer.
[FN2] Courts part company, however, on the treatment of the different term in S's acceptance.
As can be seen, subsection (1) refers to additional or different terms while subsection (2) only
expressly covers additional terms. Courts have formulated three approaches to different terms.
[FN3] One approach treats different terms the same as additional terms and therefore applies
subsection (2) to different terms. Another approach disregards different terms contained in the
acceptance since different terms are not mentioned in subsection (2) and thus are not construed
as proposals that can become part of the contract. The third approach applies the “knockout” rule
under which the conflicting terms on S and B's forms would knock each other out and would not
be part of the contract.
The knockout rule seems to be premised on the assumption that the offeree's acceptance
is treated as an acceptance only of the terms on which the documents in our hypothetical, B's
offer and S's acknowledgement, agree. [FN4] This would mean that in our hypothetical the
contract terms would not include the express warranty in B's offer.
However, on close analysis, it appears that section 2-207 and general contract principles
should preclude adoption of the so-called knockout rule and that Comment 6, [FN5] relied on by
some courts, [FN6] does not support such a rule.
The starting point for any analysis must be the language of the statute itself. Subsection
(1) of 2-207 clearly provides that “a definite and seasonable expression of acceptance... operates
as an acceptance” even though it states different terms from those “offered or agreed upon.” The
UCC does not define the word “acceptance.” Turning to contract law, [FN7] we know that an
“acceptance of an offer is a manifestation of assent to the terms thereof made by the offeree in a
manner invited or required by the offer.” [FN8] Simply put, the offeree's definite expression of
acceptance is nothing more than an expression of assent to the terms offered--and not to the
terms of the offer minus the different terms. Nothing in contract law permits an offeree to
selectively accept terms of the offer, and nothing in section 2-207 or the comments indicates that
the UCC was so radically departing from the effect of an acceptance, namely that it constitutes
an assent to the terms offered.
To be sure, subsection (1) changes the common-law contracts mirror image rule. [FN9]
In contrast to the mirror image rule, subsection (1) provides that a definite expression of
acceptance that states additional or different terms from those offered is nevertheless an
acceptance unless the offeree expressly conditions his acceptance on the offeror's assent to the
different or additional terms. Thus subsection (l) gives an offeree two choices. The offeree can
choose (i) to accept the terms offered or (ii) if the offeree does not want to assent to the terms
offered unless additional or different terms contained in his acceptance become part of the
contract, he can choose to expressly make his acceptance conditional on the offeree's assent to
the additional or different terms. Subsection (1) does not give the offeree a third choice--to
accept the terms of the offer with which the offeree agrees and to simultaneously reject the terms
in that offer with which he differs. There appears to be no room to argue that an acceptance
under subsection (1) is only an acceptance of the terms on which the offer and acceptance agree.

Thus, once the offeree sends an unconditional acceptance, he has chosen to form a contract that
contains at the very least all the terms offered. Put differently, neither section 2-207 nor the
comments suggest that the UCC was in any way rejecting the contract law concept that the
offeror is the master of the offer [FN10] and espousing a view that the offeror may be forced into
a contract on terms different from those offered. [FN11] Thus the plain language of subsection
(1) and contract law concepts would seem to bar the knockout rule.
In sum, courts adopting the knockout rule in effect are adopting a rule that flies in the
face of a basic contract concept--that the offeror is the master of the offer--and the express
language of subsection (1). Certainly if such a drastic departure from contract law principles
were intended, it would have been clearly expressed in the statute or stated in a comment.
Section 2-207 was designed to change only the mirror image rule--not the concept that
acceptance of an offer forms a contract that contains at least the terms offered.
For these reasons Comment 6 cannot be reasonably read as supporting a general
knockout rule. Further, the result under Comment 6--that conflicting terms on confirming forms
do not become part of the contract--stems from an application of section 2-207(2)(c) to those
terms and not because of a knockout rule. Assuming that a buyer's confirmation form states a
term different from those orally agreed upon, but the seller's does not, the different term on the
buyer's confirmation would fall by the wayside. This is so because there is no basis in section 2207 or general contract law principles for the different term in the buyer's confirmation to have
any effect on the oral terms the parties previously agreed upon. [FN12] Now take the case where
neither the buyer nor the seller's confirmation has any term that differs from the terms the parties
previously orally agreed upon but where B's confirmation has a term that conflicts with a term on
S's confirmation. Each of the conflicting terms on the confirmations would be an additional term
in relation to the parties' oral agreement. Such additional terms would be run through section 2207(2) and, as Comment 6 states:
Where clauses on confirming forms sent by both parties conflict each party must be
assumed to object to a clause of the other conflicting with one on the confirmation sent by
himself. As a result the requirement that there be notice of objection which is found in subsection
(2) is satisfied and the conflicting terms do not become part of the contract.
What seems clear is that conflicting terms on the buyer's and seller's confirmations do not
become part of the contract because of the application of section 2-207(2)(c) and not because
Comment 6 creates and applies a so-called knockout rule. For this reason, Comment 6 speaks of
the parties satisfying section 2-207(2)(c)'s notice of objection requirement rather than simply
saying that the terms knock each other out or cancel each other.
Supporters of the knockout rule say that if this rule is not adopted, then the sender of the
first form will have an unearned advantage. [FN13] To the extent that the sender of the first form
is given an advantage that advantage stems from section 2-207's rejection of the mirror image
rule and the last shot doctrine. This advantage can be seen from section 2-207's treatment of
additional terms. An offeree's definite expression of acceptance that contains additional terms
nevertheless constitutes an acceptance--not a rejection as under common law--and under
subsection (1) a contract is formed on the offeror's terms. The offeree's additional terms, even if
material, are treated under subsection (2) only as proposals for addition to the contract that was
already formed by the offeree's acceptance. Further, under 2-207, such additional terms cannot
become part of the contract against the offeror's will. First, material additional terms
automatically fall by the wayside unless of course the offeror expressly agrees to them. [FN14]

And nonmaterial additional terms can only become part of the contract if the parties are
merchants and the offeror does not object to them in a reasonable time. [FN15] As the first
sentence of Comment 6 explains, “if no answer is received within a reasonable time after
additional terms are proposed, it is both fair and commercially sound to assume that their
inclusion has been assented to.” Thus, under 2-207, as Professor Farnsworth aptly notes, “the
advantage has shifted from the party that fires the last shot [FN16] to the one that makes the first
offer.” [FN17] This advantage is a bit greater if the transaction is between consumers or between
a consumer and a merchant. [FN18] In such a case, the additional terms, whether material or not,
do not become part of the contract unless the offeror assents to them. In short, the UCC confers
an advantage on the offeror when dealing with additional terms and there appears to be no
indication that it did not intend to confer at least the same advantage when dealing with different
terms in the offeree's acceptance.
[FN1]. Daitom, Inc. v. Pennwalt Corp., 741 F.2d 1569, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1203 (10th Cir.
1984). See White and Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 1-3 (5th ed.); Calamari and
Perillo, Law of Contracts § 2.21 (5th ed. 2003).
[FN2]. Daitom, 741 F.2d 1569; Dorton v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 453 F.2d 1161, 10 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 585 (6th Cir. 1972); Stemcor USA, Inc. v. Trident Steel Corp., 471 F. Supp. 2d 362
(S.D. N.Y. 2006); Southern Idaho Pipe & Steel Co. v. Cal-Cut Pipe & Supply, Inc., 98 Idaho
495, 567 P.2d 1246, 22 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 25 (1977); Air Products & Chemicals, Inc. v.
Fairbanks Morse, Inc., 58 Wis. 2d 193, 206 N.W.2d 414, 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 794, 78 A.L.R.3d
619 (1973). See also White and Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 1-3 (5th ed.) (“The
language of subsection (1) contemplates contract formation by two quite different routes. Up to
the comma is one route, call it Route A. After the comma is a second route, call it Route B”).
[FN3]. Northrop Corp. v. Litronic Industries, 29 F.3d 1173, 24 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 407 (7th
Cir. 1994); Daitom, 741 F.2d 1569; Superior Boiler Works, Inc. v. R.J. Sanders, Inc., 711 A.2d
628, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 1031 (R.I. 1998). Everyone seems to ignore the Second
Restatement of Contracts position that an unconditional definite expression of acceptance that
contains additional or different terms nevertheless is operative as an acceptance and “[t]he
additional or different terms are then to be construed as proposals for modification of the
contract.” Restatement Second, Contracts § 59, comment a (1981).
[FN4]. Vulcan Automotive Equipment, Ltd. v. Global Marine Engine & Parts, Inc., 240 F. Supp.
2d 156, 49 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 743 (D.R.I. 2003); Daitom, 741 F.2d 1569. See White and
Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 1-3 (5th ed.).
[FN5]. Comment 6 reads as follows:
If no answer is received within a reasonable time after additional terms are proposed, it is both
fair and commercially sound to assume that their inclusion has been assented to. Where clauses
on confirming forms sent by both parties conflict each party must be assumed to object to a
clause of the other conflicting with one on the confirmation sent by himself. As a result the
requirement that there be notice of objection which is found in subsection (2) is satisfied and the
conflicting terms do not become a part of the contract. The contract then consists of the terms
originally expressly agreed to, terms on which the confirmations agree, and terms supplied by

this Act, including subsection (2). The written confirmation is also subject to Section 2-201.
Under that section a failure to respond permits enforcement of a prior oral argument; under this
section a failure to respond permits additional terms to become part of the agreement. [Comment
6 was amended in 1966].
[FN6]. Daitom, 741 F.2d 1569; Southern Idaho, 567 P.2d 1246. See White and Summers,
Uniform Commercial Code § 1-3 (5th ed.) (Professor White thinks that part of Comment 6
supports the view that conflicting terms on B's offer and S's acceptance cancel each other and
that the UCC does not bar this result). Although Comment 3 states that “whether or not
additional or different terms will become part of the agreement depends upon the provisions of
subsection (2),” White and Summers note that this part of Comment 3 “goes beyond the text
except insofar as it applies to confirmations of a prior agreement.”
[FN7]. See U.C.C. § 1-103 (the principles of law and equity supplement the UCC unless
displaced by a particular UCC provision).
[FN8]. Restatement Second, Contracts § 50 (1981).
[FN9]. Dorton, 453 F.2d 1161. See Calamari and Perillo, Law of Contracts § 2.21 (5th ed. 2003).
[FN10]. Farnsworth, Contracts § 3.21 (4th ed. 2004); Restatement Second, Contracts § 29,
comment a; Restatement Second, Contracts § 58, comment a.
[FN11]. Farnsworth, Contracts § 3.21 (4th ed. 2004). After noting that the knockout rule would
result in “a contract consisting, not of the offeror's terms, but of the terms as to which there is no
conflict” supplemented by UCC gap fillers, Professor Farnsworth says: “there is, however, little
reason to suppose that the drafters of the code intended such a startling departure from the notion
that the offeror is the master of the offer.”
[FN12]. See American Parts Co., Inc. (Detroit Body Products Co. Division) v. American
Arbitration Ass'n, 8 Mich. App. 156, 154 N.W.2d 5, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 119 (1967).
[FN13]. Daitom, 741 F.2d 1569; Southern Idaho, 567 P.2d 1246; Reilly Foam Corp. v.
Rubbermaid Corp., 206 F. Supp. 2d 643, 48 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 81 (E.D. Pa. 2002). See White
and Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 1-3 (5th ed.).
[FN14]. U.C.C. § 2-207(2)(b).
[FN15]. See U.C.C. § 2-207(2).
[FN16]. Farnsworth, Contracts § 3.21 (4th ed. 2004) (“In disputes over some aspect of
performance, traditional contract doctrine favors the party who fires the “last shot” in the “battle
of the forms”).
[FN17]. Farnsworth, Contracts § 3.21 (4th ed. 2004).
[FN18]. U.C.C. § 2-207(2) applies only “between merchants.”

[FNa1]. Professor of Law, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center. B.A. 1958, Yeshiva
University, J.D. 1961, New York University; former partner Kaye Scholer.
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